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Commentary: Zoonotic potential of emerging animal diseases
Samson S Y Wong, K Y Yuen
Palmer and colleagues have proposed an algorithm for
early qualitative risk assessment of the emerging
zoonotic potential of animal diseases,1 a vital problem
since more than half of all new or emerging infectious
diseases agents in humans are zoonotic in origin.2
Human infections due to agents such as the coronavi-
rus responsible for severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), avian influenza A viruses, and HIV pose enor-
mous problems because they are (a) difficult to
manage clinically, (b) prohibitively expensive to treat in
resource-poor areas, (c) capable of rapid global spread,
(d) virtually impossible to eliminate once stable
transmission among humans has been established, or
(e) capable of inducing fear and substantial economic
losses. Therefore, prior knowledge and public health
preparedness are essential for their prevention and
control. The bottleneck for this control effort lies in
discovering and characterising these agents. Once
achieved, these should be followed by systematic analy-
ses of the risk of the agents causing human diseases.
Using porcine hepatitis E virus, porcine circovirus,
bovine norovirus, Borna disease virus, and Clostridium
difficile as examples, Palmer and colleagues systemati-
cally analysed the available scientific and clinical data
on the microbes and the microbe-host interactions,
and gave recommendations on the level of confidence
of their risk of zoonotic transmission.1 Their work
exposed the fact that current knowledge is often insuf-
ficient to exclude the possibility of human infections.
In many disease syndromes where the aetiological
agents cannot be defined or when the syndrome is con-
ventionally regarded as idiopathic, clinicians often fail to
explore the history of animal exposure and do not order
microbiological tests for zoonotic agents. Many of these
tests are not routinely available in local hospital labora-
tories, and serological tests for animal diseases are gen-
erally not standardised for testing human samples.
When zoonotic transmission occurs, some muta-
tions might have occurred which could impair the sen-
sitivity of rapid tests such as nucleic acid amplification.
Most scientists agree that the mechanisms of interspe-
cies jumping between viruses are poorly understood. It
takes only a single amino acid change to alter the
receptor binding specificity of the haemagglutinin of
influenza A H5N1 virus, allowing the virus to be trans-
mitted from chicken to human rather than just chicken
to chicken.3 Similarly, the substitution of one amino
acid in the surface spike protein of SARS coronavirus
changes its specificity from civets to human.4
Thus, any preceding epidemiological, clinical, and
microbiological analysis may not be able to foretell
such events—with potentially catastrophic conse-
quences. As a result, it would not be possible to make
confident recommendations for public health deci-
sions or risk communications to the public without
continuous research effort and a comprehensive
surveillance programme. Continuous serological and
disease monitoring for workers with frequent animal
exposure could be a sentinel system for this
surveillance programme.
The search for new microbial agents in animals is
equally important because the simian immunodefi-
ciency virus and bat SARS coronavirus were discov-
ered shortly after human infections with SARS
coronavirus andHIVwerenoted.5 6 Thehumancorona-
virus OC43 is believed to have been acquired after an
interspecies jump from bovine coronavirus in the 19th
century.7 It is theoretically possible that such precursor
or related viruses could be discovered once a family of
virus is known to exist by a comprehensive virological
search in animals. This should, of course, be followed
by regular monitoring of its evolution and spread in
animals. Coupled with the surveillance in occupation-
ally exposed people, it might give us a better idea of the
zoonotic risk of these agents.
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